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Abstract
The LOCKSS program has developed and
deployed in a world-wide test a system for pre-
serving access to academic journals published on
the Web. The fundamental problem for any dig-
ital preservation system is that it must be af-
fordable for the long term. To reduce the cost
of ownership, the LOCKSS system uses generic
PC hardware, open source software, and peer-
to-peer technology. It is packaged as a “network
appliance”, a single-function box that can be con-
nected to the Internet, configured and left alone
to do its job with minimal monitoring or admin-
istration. The first version of this system was
based on a Linux boot floppy. After three years
of testing it was replaced by a second version,
based on OpenBSD and booting from CD-ROM.
We focus in this paper on the design, im-
plementation and deployment of a network appli-
ance based on an open source operating system.
We provide an overview of the LOCKSS appli-
cation and describe the experience of deploying
and supporting its first version. We list the re-
quirements we took from this to drive the design
of the second version, describe how we satisfied
them in the OpenBSD environment, and report
on the initial deployment of this second version
of the appliance.
1 Introduction
The LOCKSS1 (Lots Of Copies Keep Stuff
Safe) program has developed and deployed test
versions of a system for preserving access to aca-
demic journals published on the Web. The funda-
mental problem for any digital preservation sys-
tem is that it must be affordable for the long
term. To reduce the cost of ownership, the
LOCKSS system uses generic PC hardware, open
1LOCKSS is a trademark of Stanford University.
source software, and peer-to-peer technology. It
is packaged as a “network appliance”, a single-
function box that can be connected to the Inter-
net, configured and left alone to do its job with
minimal monitoring or administration. The ap-
pliance has to operate, exposed to the Internet, in
environments lacking skilled system administra-
tors, without imposing large administrative costs
to install, maintain or upgrade it.
The first version was based on a boot-floppy
distribution of Linux. After three years of test-
ing at over 50 libraries world-wide, this appli-
ance level of the system was replaced by a sec-
ond version, based on a modified version of the
OpenBSD install CD-ROM. It was deployed to
the test systems around the world in January
2003. The application levels of the system have
also been redesigned and reimplemented from
scratch; deployment of this new implementation
started in May 2003.
We focus in this paper on the design, im-
plementation and deployment of a network ap-
pliance based on an open source operating sys-
tem. The goals and overall architecture of the
LOCKSS system [18], the redesign of the pro-
tocol by which the peers communicate [12] and
its economic underpinnings [19] are covered else-
where.
We provide an overview of the application
the network appliance is designed to support. We
describe the experience of deploying and support-
ing its first version. We list the requirements we
took from this as a basis for the design of the
second version, describe how we satisfied them
in the OpenBSD environment, and report on the
initial deployment of this second version of the
appliance.
2 The LOCKSS Program
Scientific communication has transitioned
to the Web. In particular, much peer-reviewed
science now appears only in e-journal form [10].
Academic journals are funded by university and
other librarians paying institutional subscription
rates. These librarians consider it part of their
job to preserve access to the record of science for
future generations. The transition to the Web
has meant a transition from a purchase model,
in which librarians buy and own a copy of the
journal, to a rental model, in which librarians
rent access to the publisher’s copy. Year-by-year
rental provides no guarantee of future access, and
librarians fear the worst. Publishers are moti-
vated to allay these fears and persuade libraries
to switch to electronic-only subscriptions, which
save the publishers money.
The LOCKSS program is implementing the
purchase model for the Web, providing tools li-
brarians can use to take custody of, and preserve
access to, web-published journals. The tools al-
low libraries to run persistent web caches that:
• collect material by crawling the e-journal
Web sites,
• distribute material by acting like a proxy
cache to make it seem to a library’s read-
ers that web pages are still available at
their original URL, even if they are no
longer available there from the original pub-
lisher [21].
• preserve material by cooperating with other
library’s caches in a peer-to-peer network to
detect and repair damage.
The LOCKSS cache is implemented as a
single daemon process written in Java. It in-
cludes a specialized web crawler, the Jetty [6]
web server to provide both a Web proxy and an
administration user interface, and the peer com-
munication protocol.
We believe that the major threats to digi-
tal preservation are economic rather than tech-
nological; library budgets, especially for preser-
vation, are never adequate [4]. If LOCKSS is
to succeed in preserving access for future gener-
ations, libraries must be able to afford the sys-
tem in the long term, through the inevitable ups
and downs of their budgets. The goal of the
LOCKSS program is to reduce the economic risks
by spreading the total cost of preservation across
many independent budgets, minimizing the im-
pact on each individual budget, and lowering the
economic barrier to entry.
Cost reduction has, therefore, been a major
focus of the program from its inception. Both the
LOCKSS daemon and its operating system plat-
form are free and open source, and use generic
PC hardware to reduce hard costs as much as
possible.
Soft costs, especially support and system
administration, can easily dominate the hard
costs. Maintaining availability of Internet ser-
vices over the long term is very difficult. Even
at sites with expensive, skilled professional sys-
tem adminstrators between 20-50% of outages
are caused by operator error [15].
Although it would be possible to include the
LOCKSS daemon among a variety of services on
a large server, the very long time horizons and
slow operation of the system are unlike the other
services that it might be running.
Machine boundaries can provide effective
fault isolation. This encourages our belief that
the overall reliability and cost of the system can
be improved by packaging the daemon, its sys-
tem infrastructure, and the hardware it needs
into a network appliance. By reducing the eco-
nomic barrier to entry as far as possible we hope
to broaden the base of libraries engaged in digital
preservation activities. On the other hand, we ex-
pect many larger libraries will run the LOCKSS
daemon without its appliance platform.
Our network appliance design is intended
to reduce both the cost and the risk of system
administration by identifying the expensive and
risky operations involved, and either eliminating
or automating them. Our top candidates are in-
stallation, upgrade, and recovery from compro-
mise. We have succeeded in almost completely
eliminating system administrator involvement in
all three. We believe our ideas and experience in
this area could be helpful to others.
3 Lessons
The first version of the LOCKSS appli-
ance [18] was based on the Linux Router Project
(LRP) platform [16], a boot floppy containing
a minimal but functional Linux system in a
RAMdisk. For our application, it was capable of
downloading and installing into a temporary file
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system the LOCKSS daemon and the software
on which it depended, such as the Java Virtual
Machine (JVM), that would not fit on the floppy,
To begin running the appliance, the host
institution downloaded and ran a Windows pro-
gram that formatted, wrote and checked a generic
version of the floppy. When a generic PC was
booted from this floppy, it asked the operator
for the necessary configuration information then
personalized the floppy, partitioned the disk and
created the necessary file systems on it.
Booting the personalized floppy ran the
normal LRP boot sequence then downloaded the
necessary LOCKSS software, installed it in a
temporary file system, and finally invoked the
JVM to run the daemon.
The system evolved over about 3 years of
testing to run at over 50 libraries worldwide and
was generally sucessful in requiring neither great
skill nor much attention from the host institu-
tion. This taught us many valuable lessons. The
most important of these was that running the
system exclusively from write-locked media (and
from software verified against hashes on write-
locked media) greatly simplifies two critical tasks:
installing and configuring a new system, and re-
covering from a compromise.
In unskilled hands the process of installing
and configuring a Unix system to be adequately
secure is a daunting and error-prone task. Run-
ning an almost completely pre-configured system
from write-locked media obviates almost all the
effort and risk.
Restoring a compromised system is a daunt-
ing and error-prone task even in skilled hands. A
simple reboot is all that is needed to restore the
LOCKSS appliance to a known state. If the com-
promise damaged or even completely destroyed
the stored content, the normal peer-to-peer com-
munication will compare the damaged content
with the content at other peers and repair it from
them or the publisher.
It may take many weeks to completely re-
cover a destroyed peer. However, once the dam-
age has been detected any potentially damaged
and not yet repaired content actually requested
by readers can be obtained from other peers. Old
academic papers are infrequently accessed [3], so
the load of these requests is not significant.
Other important lessons we learned in-
cluded:
• The floppy disks, used only during boot,
were remarkably reliable. We had very few
media problems.
• Operators did not always pay attention to
instructions to write-lock their floppy disks.
• Squeezing the software we needed into the
limited confines of even a 1.68MB-formatted
floppy, and working with non-standard
floppy formats, was too time-consuming and
error-prone for our small team.
• In the interests of security, MD5 hashes
of the downloaded platform software were
stored on the floppy. It was thus necessary to
persuade each test site to create a new boot
floppy before it could run a newly-released
version of the platform software, for example
to patch a vulnerability. This had its bright
side, in that we were sure their configura-
tion was consistent, but it was an operations
nightmare and very time-consuming.
• Partly because of this inefficient upgrade
path, the small number of security vulnera-
bilities discovered in our environment during
the test consumed a totally disproportionate
amount of the team’s efforts. This was com-
pounded by the way they tended to occur
during holidays.
• A second reason for the difficulty in respond-
ing to security vulnerabilities was the need
to rebuild the distribution after patching it.
LRP’s build process was never very robust
and our modifications were so extensive that
building it became too fragile a process to
manage under the time pressure of a secu-
rity incident.
• LOCKSS caches need static, globally
routable IP addresses and communicate via
UDP. They can be run behind firewalls or
network address translation (NAT) boxes
but doing so involves negotiation with the
host institution’s network administrators. If
they are run outside the firewall, a differ-
ent negotiation with the network adminis-
trators may be required. Some sites insist
on security audits before installation. The
LOCKSS appliance needs a simple, easy-to-
explain, and convincing security story.
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4 Requirements
From this experience we developed require-
ments for the second version of the system:
• Use only generic PC hardware.
• Install the operating system, application and
all other software afresh in a newly-created
evanescent filesystem on every boot.
• Even if the system is compromised, there
must be no place a Trojan horse could be
hidden. All file systems that persist across
reboots must be mounted with noexec, no-
suid and nodev options.
• All software, including the daemon, must ei-
ther run directly from read-only media or
from packages whose signatures are verified
by software running directly from read-only
media before being installed into evanescent
file systems.
• The public keys used to verify the signatures,
and thus permitted to sign software, must be
stored on write-locked media.
• Each package should carry multiple signa-
tures. It must be impossible for revocation
of a single key to cause the system to fail.
• The set of keys trusted to sign packages must
be under the control of the appliance opera-
tor.
• Media containing system configuration data
or keys must be write-locked while the net-
work is up.
• Non-writability of media must be tested, not
assumed.
• No process sending or receiving network
data may run as root.
• The system must walk the user through the
configuration process and test that the sup-
plied values work before accepting them.
• Upgrading the system should require only a
reboot.
• The response to a newly-discovered vulnera-
bility should be simple and rapid, both to re-
move the vulnerability and repair any dam-
age to a compromised appliance’s state.
• The system must be easy for a small team
to support. Our criteria for this were:
– Use a major OS distribution with se-
curity as its primary focus; don’t use a
minor distribution with a limited base
of support such as LRP.
– Don’t use a floppy-based distribution
such as PicoBSD [5]; squeezing GnuPG
and other things we need onto a floppy
is not feasible, and the industry is phas-
ing out floppy disks.
– Don’t change the OS build-from-source
process.
– Maintain a minimal footprint in the OS
source.
– Build the entire environment from
scratch automatically every night.
5 Trust Model
We assume that libraries are capable
of maintaining the physical security of their
LOCKSS appliances. This leads us to trust to
some extent the content of write-locked media in
the machine’s drives; an attacker capable of re-
placing the CD from which the machine boots
can obviously damage the machine’s content.
We limit this trust to the boot image and a
few other files on the CD for which there wasn’t
space in the image (Section 6). All other software
must carry a valid signature from at least one of a
set of keys which are trusted by the system’s ad-
ministrator and not known to be revoked. The
trusted software consists of the kernel and the
utilities needed to perform the key revocation
check, signature validation and software instal-
lation.
This technique has similarities to the
Trusted Computing Platform Architecture
(TCPA) [2]. Our goals, however are quite differ-
ent. TCPA is intended to enable programs which
do not trust the administrator of the system
on which they are running to verify that the
system’s integrity is attested to by keys that the
program does trust. LOCKSS peers do not trust
each other and do not run third-party software;
the integrity of the software on a LOCKSS
cache is of purely local interest. Thus our, much
weaker, goal is to assure the administrator of the
system that, at least immediately after a reboot,
it is running only software whose integrity is
attested to by keys that the adminstrator trusts.
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Lacking the hardware and BIOS support
of TCPA, we cannot fully achieve this goal. A
remote root compromise could in some circum-
stances allow the attacker to modify the system’s
BIOS and thereby disable the signature verifica-
tion process. This in turn might allow spurious
software to persist across reboots. To minimize
this and other risks of a remote root compromise,
we run with OpenBSD’s kern.securelevel variable
set to 2, the most restrictive possible, and we re-
move the debugger from our kernel.
6 Background
These requirements led us to a design based
on adapting the OpenBSD install CD. The design
of this bootable CD is a series of layers, which we
describe from the outside in:
• Booting a PC from a CD requires that the
image of a 2.88MB “boot floppy” be present
on the CD.
• In the case of OpenBSD, this “boot floppy”
contains an FFS file system and the biosboot
program, which the PC’s BIOS locates and
starts.
• The file system contains a compressed ker-
nel image, which biosboot loads into memory
and executes.
• Part of the kernel’s data space is a RAMdisk
image containing an FFS file system 1.7MB
big, which is mounted as the root file system.
• This file system contains skeletal system di-
rectories such as /etc and /dev. It also con-
tains a single crunched binary which imple-
ments all the commands needed for the in-
stallation.
The kernel starts up in the normal way, but
it runs a special /etc/rc script that walks the user
through the installation process. The shell and
all the other commands needed to run this script
are in the crunched binary.
The crunched binary is constructed from
the regular source tree by a pair of tools called
crunchgen and crunchide. Crunchgen works from
a list of commands by locating the Makefile for
each command in the source tree, and writing a
new Makefile, a set of stub programs and a top-
level main() that calls the stub chosen by argv[0].
The new Makefile builds the appropriate set of
object files from the command sources, then links
each command and its stub into an intermediate
file that is processed by crunchide to hide all its
global symbols except those of the stub. Finally,
the intermediate files are linked with the gener-
ated main() into the crunched binary.
7 Design
Our approach was to replace the /etc/rc
script run by the minimal “boot floppy” environ-
ment on the install CD with a slightly augmented
regular system’s /etc/rc which:
• Establishes swap space.
• Confirms that the configuration floppy is not
writable.
• Creates an evanescent file system in the swap
space; redirecting the system directories into
it via symlinks.
• Validates the signatures on the necessary
software packages.
• Installs the packages into the evanescent file
system (via the symlinks).
• Installs the network configuration informa-
tion from the floppy.
• Runs only the essential services:
– The SSH daemon [22] for remote ad-
ministration, with privilege separa-
tion [17]
– The LOCKSS daemon inside the JVM
run as an unprivileged user.
– The appliance does not run sendmail.
Outbound mail is sent by ssmtp, a min-
imal SMTP client. Inbound mail is not
accepted.
• Installs a crontab entry that implements the
automatic package update mechanism.
The package update mechanism at inter-
vals chooses at random from a list of download
servers. As an unprivileged user it checks that
server for new packages and signatures and down-
loads any found. It caches them on the hard disk.
They will be used at the next reboot if their sig-
natures are valid. Although a compromise could
allow these cached packages to be modified, doing
so would invalidate their signatures. An invalid
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signature causes the boot process to ignore that
version of the package and revert to an earlier
version, probably the one on the CD.
8 Build Process
The implementation resides en-
tirely in directory hierarchies below
/usr/src/distrib/i386/lockss/. except for:
• The LOCKSS kernel config file.
• Three directories in
/usr/src/distrib/special/ :
– A skeleton implementation of host, to
avoid the full glory of the BIND imple-
mentation.
– A skeleton implementation of sudo, ca-
pable only of being used by root to
give up privileges. This allows us to
avoid root processes accessing the net-
work during the boot sequence.
– An altered Makefile for init, needed to
get it to go multi-user by default.
• An additional entry in
/usr/src/distrib/i386/Makefile that builds
the LOCKSS CD.
Our goal of maintaining a small footprint
in the distribution source has been met.
Our build script starts by checking the
patch branch out from OpenBSD’s AnonCVS [7]
service into a temporary build tree, updating our
copy of the ports tree, then checking the im-
plementation of the LOCKSS appliance platform
out from our CVS server and copying it into place
in the build tree.
The build process then patches the kernel
source to install one additional driver, for swdt, a
kernel-based software watchdog that reboots the
system if a user-level daemon fails to reset the
watchdog at least every 30 seconds. It can some-
times recover a system that has locked up.
The build process is essentially the
OpenBSD install CD build process. It results
in a bootable CD very similar to OpenBSD’s,
but containing in addition to the basic OpenBSD
packages a set of packages from the ports tree, in-
cluding the JVM, the Red Hat emulator needed
to run it, ssmtp and some libraries they depend
on. It also contains a set of LOCKSS packages
containing the daemon and its environment. In-
stalled on the CD itself is GnuPG [9], and the
shared libraries it needs to run.
Distributing new CD images, having ad-
ministrators burn them and use them to reboot
their systems is too time-consuming and expen-
sive to fix security vulnerabilities or for routine
upgrades to the application. The crontab en-
try described above can download packages and
cache them on the disk for use at the next reboot.
To avoid mistakes, there is no separate build pro-
cess for packages distributed in this way. An up-
grade package is built by building an entire CD
image, extracting the package from it and sign-
ing it. The package and its signature are placed
on the download servers, and mail is sent to the
sites asking them to:
• log in as root
• execute a script that checks for new packages
• reboot
9 Implementation
The implementation consists almost en-
tirely of three shell scripts, residing in the
RAMdisk image in the CD’s ”boot floppy”, which
are executed during the system boot process.
The work they do means that our appliance takes
a rather long time to boot, but in the field of dig-
ital preservation speed is not a requirement (see
10). The scripts are:
• /etc/rc.0.lockss, which is executed very early
in /etc/rc, before swap is enabled;
• /etc/rc.1.lockss, which is executed later in
/etc/rc, once the file systems are mounted;
• and /etc/lockss.start, which is executed at
the end of /etc/rc.local.
The implementation also uses GnuPG
which (together with the libraries it needs) is ac-
cessed directly from a directory on the CD, to en-
sure that its testimony as to the trustworthiness
of the packages to be installed can be trusted.
The keys used in this process are on the write-
locked floppy and are thus under the control of
the appliance operator, who can add or delete
keys, and also add signatures to the floppy. This
is an important point; forcing our users to trust
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RAMfs /
dist usr cachetmp
FFS
Figure 1: The file name space as /etc/rc.1.lockss
starts.
our keys would allow us to shut the system down
if we chose.
The remaining part of the implementation
consists of some changes to the list of files to be
”crunched” together to form the command bi-
nary in the minimal system in the CD’s ”boot
floppy”.
9.1 /etc/rc.0.lockss
This script is run just before swap is turned
on to ensure that there is swap space available.
It examines the available hard disks and, if they
have not yet been partitioned appropriately, asks
permission then does so.
The first hard disk is partitioned with about
a gigabyte of swap space; the remainder and
all other disks are used as file systems to con-
tain preserved content. It creates an appropri-
ate /etc/fstab describing them and the MFS [20]
file system that will be created later in the swap
space.
9.2 /etc/rc.1.lockss
This script implements the bulk of the
LOCKSS ”platform”. We describe it in narra-
tive form. The file name space as the script
starts is defined by the /etc/fstab written by
/etc/rc.0.lockss. It is shown in Figure 1.
It attempts to mount the CD the system
was booted from and, if it cannot, calls for help.
It is not unknown to find that the kernel auto-
configuration process has failed to recognize the
CD from which it was booted.
It then mounts the MFS file system on
/dist. At this point the /tmp directory is still
where it was on boot, in the RAMdisk, and it is
about to run out of space. The script relocates
/tmp into the newly-created MFS by copying its
content to /dist/tmp and replacing it with a sym-
link there.
It checks to see if there is a floppy in the
drive. If not, it runs the configuration process
described below. If there is one but it is write-
enabled, the script refuses to proceed until it is
write-locked. If there is a write-locked floppy, any
configuration information it contains supercedes
any configuration information on the CD. The
GnuPG public keyring is initialized from the
floppy.
It then checks all the packages it can find on
the package path and writes a script that, when
later executed, will for each necessary package in-
stall the latest available version which has at least
one valid signature. The package path consists of
the floppy, specific directories on the CD, and the
cache of downloaded packages on the hard disk.
Note that during this process the entire running
environment consists of the RAMdisk image from
the CD, GnuPG (being run directly from the
CD), and configuration data from a floppy that is
known to be write-locked. The checking process
is as follows:
• The network is bought up using the configu-
ration information but without any daemons
running.
• GnuPG is invoked as an unprivileged user to
do a key revocation check on its keyring.
• The network is shut down.
• The valid-MD5 list is initialized to be empty.
• All detached signatures for any MD5 files
found in the package path are checked. If
at least one valid signature by a key that is
not known to be revoked is found, that file’s
list of MD5s is added to the valid-MD5 list.
• The install-package script is initialized to be
null.
• The package path is searched for versions of
the necessary packages. The MD5 of each
version found is computed and compared
against the valid-MD5 list. If a match is
found, and a command to install a lower ver-
sion number of the package is already in the
install-package script, it is deleted. Then a
command to install this version is added to
the script.
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Figure 2: The file name space as /etc/rc.1.lockss
ends.
• If no unrevoked signature validates the MD5
of a package that must be installed, the boot
process is aborted and the system enters
“hunker-down” mode. It, and its preserved
content, are inaccessible from the network
and thus should be safe for some time. The
administrator will need to add new signa-
tures to the floppy before resuming normal
operation.
The script next prepares for package instal-
lation by creating copies of the system directories
under /dist and replacing the originals with sym-
links pointing to the copies.
The system then executes the install-
package script it wrote. This first installs the
OpenBSD base ”packages” into directories in the
MFS under /dist, then replaces the “boot-floppy”
system directories with symlinks to the installed
versions in /dist. Now the file name space ap-
proximates a properly installed OpenBSD sys-
tem, and the install script continues to install
a chosen set of real packages from the ports tree,
and a small number of LOCKSS packages. Al-
though any of these packages may come from any
of the directories in the package path, each is
known to have had its MD5 signed by at least
one unrevoked key trusted by the system’s ad-
ministrator.
Finally, the script unmounts everything it
mounted and returns to the /etc/rc script. The
file name space at this point is shown in Figure 2.
9.3 /etc/lockss.start
This script is run by /etc/rc.local just be-
fore the end of the system boot process, after the
few system daemons we have not disabled have
been started. It enables the watchdog, checks for
the required LOCKSS daemon configuration files
and, if it finds them, invokes the JVM to run the
LOCKSS daemon.
9.4 Configuration
LOCKSS peers use their IP address as their
long-term identity and thus, at present, do not
support DHCP. If no configuration information is
available, early in /etc/rc.1.lockss a text dialog is
used to acquire an IP address, netmask, gateway,
DNS servers, root password etc.
The supplied values are validated by using
them to bring up the network interface temporar-
ily and, as an unprivileged user, perform some
simple tests such as a DNS lookup. If the tests
work, the network interface is shut down. The
user is asked to write-enable the floppy, and the
configuration is written to the floppy as a text
file. New SSH host keys are generated and stored
on the floppy, together with the initial GnuPG
public keyring. The user is then asked to write-
lock the floppy. The system verifies that it is
write-locked before proceeding.
10 Performance
One performance issue that might make
these techniques unsuitable for other applications
is that it takes the system some time to boot. On
a 400MHz PC, somewhat slower than those our
test sites typically use, with a 40X IDE CD drive,
the boot sequence takes about 320s from reset
to login prompt. This includes about 30s check-
ing signatures and hashes, about 25s installing
the OpenBSD base packages, and about 180s in-
stalling about 96MB of other packages.
If our caches reboot once every 60 days this
would represent about 0.006% downtime, a rea-
sonable price to pay for low administrative costs.
Although we don’t have accurate data, we be-
lieve our test caches reboot significantly less of-
ten than this. Obviously, reducing the size of the
packages to be installed would reduce the impact
of rebooting on availability, and there is much
scope for doing so.
Once the system is up, its performance is
indistinguishable from a similar system running
a more conventional configuration of OpenBSD.
A more critical performance measure is the
time taken to respond to a security vulnerabil-
ity. We simulated this by involving our test sites
in a “firedrill”, in which we generated and dis-
tributed a “patch” that simply sent us an e-mail
8
confirming that the system had downloaded and
was using it. The firedrill showed that building
and distributing a patch is now far more efficient
than it was for the Linux floppy version. With
little effort on our or their part we were able to
get 96% of the deployed systems upgraded within
48 hours of the start of the firedrill.
11 Deployment
In general, the design, implementation and
rollout of the new version to over 50 test sites
went smoothly. Almost all our test sites have
been trouble-free since their upgrade in January
2003 from the floppy version. This is a great
tribute to the quality of OpenBSD.
The LOCKSS appliance has survived secu-
rity audits by some fairly demanding sites (e.g.
CERN and LANL).
12 Problems
We did encounter a number of problems.
Our initial design involved union mounting
the MFS file system over the root directory. This
didn’t work; it seemed to cause deadlock in the
kernel. We have not verified that the problem is
still present; working around it seemed preferable
to diagnosing problems that early in the boot se-
quence.
OpenBSD appears to provide no way to
check whether a floppy is write-locked or write-
enabled without mounting it, and seeing whether
an attempt to write to it fails. If it does fail, the
kernel generates alarming error messages which
the operator has to be told to ignore. OpenBSD
currently lacks FreeBSD’s mechanism for selec-
tively disabling these messages.
We orignally wanted to use the system itself
to burn the CDs. Again, the operator has to
ignore some alarming error messages, so we put
the idea aside.
The kernel autoconfiguration sometimes
fails to recognize the CD from which it was
booted, causing the attempt to mount the CD
to fail, and preventing the system installing soft-
ware from it. Power-cycling the machine seems
to be the only cure.
The native 1.3 JVM for OpenBSD wasn’t
available, so we run the Linux JVM under the
RedHat emulator. This works well but installing
the emulator and the RPM package slows the
boot considerably and makes us nervous.
The RPM-based package install for the
JVM insists on executing from a path in /usr ;
we have to specifically turn off noexec during this
install and re-enable it afterwards.
We ask our test sites to download an image
of each new version of the CD as a .iso file, write
a CD-R of it using some other machine, and boot
their cache machine from it. The first time they
tried this, about 1 in 20 sites had problems of
one kind or another that required support from
the team. Examples are difficulty with Windows
CD-writing software, difficulty with boot device
settings in the BIOS, and bad CD-R media.
Despite our suggestion that they use
second-hand machines, our enthusiastic test sites
often buy brand-new hardware. This frequently
has motherboard Ethernet chips which are too
new for the OpenBSD drivers to use. We have ac-
cumulated a reserve of really old Ethernet cards
to mail out in such cases.
The security vulnerability firedrill demon-
strated a need to improve our process for making
a patch available. In particular, we need to fo-
cus on making our test sites aware that when we
say “you need to reboot your system right now”
they need to pay attention. We hope that exer-
cising this process regularly will make it go more
smoothly when it is needed “for real”; the 96%
success in 48 hours of the first drill is not good
enough.
13 Related Work
Our work has similarities with
KNOPPIX[11] and other bootable Linux
CDs used as demo and rescue systems. They
typically run directly from the CD rather than,
as we do, installing system packages into an
evanescent file system. We take a lot longer to
boot while we do the installation, but we can
validate the signatures on the packages, and thus
use downloaded signed packages to upgrade the
system on the CD.
Sun’s Cobalt product line [13] is an excel-
lent example of packaging Linux into an network
appliance that works well with limited adminis-
tration. Our automatic software upgrade mech-
anism was inspired by Cobalt’s, which has auto-
matic notification of availability but manual in-
stallation.
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14 Future Work
Work on the platform is on hold for a while;
while we focus on using it to deploy a completely
re-written version of the daemon. When we get
back to it, our to-do list includes in descending
order of priority:
• supporting DHCP, NAT, and machines be-
hind firewalls,
• using native Java,
• supporting USB storage devices for configu-
ration,
• building a KNOPPIX-like LOCKSS demo
mode,
• burning CDs from the system itself to allow
packages and configuration data to be stored
on the CD,
• revisiting the idea of union mounting MFS
over the root.
There is also the possibility of extend-
ing this work to interesting and useful ar-
eas that aren’t directly related to the mis-
sion of LOCKSS. Extensions to the stackable
Open Source BIOS [1], which is based on Lin-
uxBIOS [14], could provide a trusted boot se-
quence on which we could base our verification of
the higher levels of the system. Combining this
with a physically write-protected USB “dongle”
containing the keys could provide almost all the
capabilities of TCPA for Open Source systems
except tamper-resistance and secret key protec-
tion.
15 Conclusion
In many ways, OpenBSD has proven an ex-
cellent basis for our network appliance. It was
easy to adapt the install CD to our purposes.
The carefully created default configuration is an
excellent starting point for further restrictions.
The use of privilege separation in the SSH dae-
mon reduces the risk of allowing adminstrative
access via the network. OpenBSD 3.3’s addi-
tion of Stack Smashing Protection [8] adds fur-
ther protection. AnonCVS access to the patch
branch and the ports tree has allowed us to build
an up-to-date system from scratch every night,
materially reducing the load on a small support
team, especially when responding to new vulner-
abilities. The OpenBSD build process is well-
structured and allowed us to add a new CD image
with little effort, both initially and as the base
distribution evolved from 3.1 to 3.2 then 3.3.
We have added to OpenBSD a set of capa-
bilities that allow it to serve quite satisfactorily
as a network appliance with unskilled administra-
tors, if only for an application that can tolerate
extended reboot times. These include:
• Running the system entirely from evanescent
file systems re-created from write-locked me-
dia at boot time, with no ability to execute
code from a persistent file system.
• Verifying the signatures on all software dur-
ing the boot process.
• Implementing a semi-automatic patch distri-
bution mechanism for packages and their sig-
natures.
There are, however some deficiencies in
OpenBSD that still cause significant problems as
we deploy it as an appliance. Those causing the
most support load are:
• The kernel produces many scary-looking er-
ror messages in non-error situations.
• The kernel does not reliably recognize low-
cost IDE CD drives.
• The NIC drivers are sometimes unable to
recognize or use leading-edge hardware.
There is never a perfect choice of platform
for an application; all choices have advantages
and disadvantages. OpenBSD has served us as
well as we expected, and we hope that others im-
plementing network appliances will find our expe-
riences useful, whether they agree with our choice
or not.
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17 Availability
The source for the entire LOCKSS sys-
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above, carries BSD-style Open Source licenses
and is available from the LOCKSS project at
SourceForge.
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